Schechtman on Personhood and Personal Identity

There are two questions which an early Marya Schechtman asks regarding identity and personhood.

• What history am I defined by (re-identification and bodily criterion)

• What are my values, beliefs, and desires (self-knowledge, psychological criterion)

Such questions are important when we are often attempting to discover who we are, or define who we might be. This may become necessary when attempting to determine how to reconcile our past, current or future behaviors. A way to do so is by determining who we take ourselves to be and calculating what kinds of behaviors are a likely consequence. A popular example is that of someone who seems to remember leading soldiers into battle at Waterloo. But lets further imagine that they were born in 1980 rather than 1780. This is an extreme case however, but there is a more mundane case that can reflect the concern we associate with identity claims.

Lets imagine that for whatever reason, I seem to remember putting my keys on the kitchen counter. However, this memory may conflict with who I believe myself to be. As I have always thought of myself as the kind of self who lives an orderly and regimented life. This means that I keep an orderly home, always placing my items in the places that I designate for them. The kitchen counter is not the kind of place that I have designated for my keys and as such, I cannot reconcile this memory (putting my keys on the kitchen counter) with the kind of self that I take myself to be.

On a bodily criterion, identity is established if and only if the body of A is continuous with the body of B. The question being whether my body is the same body as the self that places their keys on the kitchen counter rather than the key hook in the entryway. If it is, then we have established identity.

However, there are various views that understand the psychological account of continuity as better expressing what we mean by identity. For instance, how do we explain phrases such as it is hard for me to reconcile the person I was with who I am. Or consider questions of legal punishment. We might think a particular inmate deserves clemency because they are no longer the person who committed a given crime. If bodily criterion is the only acceptable criterion for identity, then how do we explain rehabilitation or salvation?

Whether or not I identify with the sort of personality that places their keys un-reflectively on the kitchen counter rather than the key hook in the entryway is another way of understanding why the psychological criterion is important. Contemporary philosophical discussion on personal identity is generally concerned with reidentification and not self-knowledge. A look at one of the most prominant views in this area will follow in Section 1.

Two opposing views generally have been

• bodily criterion (sameness of body grounds personhood)

• psychological criterion (personality grounds personhood)

Schechtman criticizes the psychological criterion on account that it does not provide the sort of criterion of personal identity that does not presuppose that same identity.

I shall argue that psychological continuity does not and cannot provide the sort of criterion of personal identity which identity theorists which to provide.

This leads to two related claims. That:

• psychological continuity is circular

and that:

• so cannot provide analysis of our concept of the persistence of a person

This means that neither bodily criterion can explain identity of a person over time, but neither that the current conceptions of psychological criterion can do so as well.

Section 1, Parfit’s view

Derek Parfit initially gives a view of identity that does not presuppose identity (reductionist). His view is a good starting point for understanding the psychological criterion and to see why it initially seemed plausible.

First, an identity criterion will

• consists in holding certain facts

• these facts can be described without presupposing the identity of the person they belong to

The context

• Understanding non-reductive identity criterion as:

  • giving an identity criterion that does not employ facts about persons or their identities in its specification

For Parfit, these are facts that establish direct psychological connections between:

        - between a memory and the experience

        - between an intention and an action which carried out the intention

        - persistence of a belief, desire, or other psychological feature

“The Psychological Criterion: (1) There is psychological continuity if and only if there are overlapping chains of strong connectedness. X today is one and the same person as Y at some past time if and only if (2) X is psychologically continuous with Y, (3) this continuity has the right kind of cause, and (4) there does not exist a different person who is also” (pdf) “psychologically continuous with Y. (5) Personal identity over time just consists in the holding of facts like (2) to (4) (207).” (Schechtman, 1990, p. 73) (pdf) (Schechtman, 1990, p. 72)

• There is strong psychological continuity: person A, is the same person as B, where A means some individual person at a point in time t1 prior to an individual person B at a time subsequent to t1, say t2. if and only if there are strong overlapping chains of interconnectedness including:

    1. psychological continuance
    2. continuity has the right kind of cause
    3. there does not exist a different person who is psychologically continuous with *B*
    4. and that personal identity over time just consists in the holding of facts like 1-3.
  

Section 2, The circularity objection and standard response

But, “we can seem to remember experiences which are not ours . . . such seeming memories are no basis for claims of personal identity”

• (2) x is psychologically continuous with y

  • presupposition?

• (3) this continuity has the right kind of cause

  • what would be the right kind of cause for a memory?

  • memory presupposes “persistence of a single individual”

    • genuine vs delusional memory is defined by identity vs nonidentity

  • intention

    • action counts as intended if same person so defined by identity

• (4) there does not exist a different person who is also “psychologically continuous with y.

  • false memories would have two different persons that are psychologically continuous with y.

  • only one person if the other has lost their memory of an event

Parfit’s response to this objection is grounded in undefined quasi states.

• quasi memories

• quasi intentions

The circularity objection

1. We can only remember our own experiences

2. (1) The fact that we can only remember our own experiences is not [cannot be] the reason why (genuine) memory connectedness is a plausible criterion of personal identity

3. Yet quasi-memory connectedness will do just as well as genuine memory in specifying an identity criterion

4. Therefore, whatever is the reason why genuine memory specifies an identity criterion, is also present in quasi memory

5. But (1 -2), The fact that we can only remember our own experiences [cannot be] the reason why quasi memory connectedness is a plausible criterion of personal identity

   1. The nondelusionality of a memory

   2. its relevance to the constitution of personal identity

According to the circularity objection, memory presupposes personal identity.

However, the examples that are used to underlie this claim, rely on the need to use personal identity to distinguish between delusional and nondelusional memories.

• How do we prove that genuine memory is nondelusional without presupposing personal identity?

• One problem is that in answering the above question

  • does not show us that quasi memories capture what is relevant to personal identity in genuine memory

  • cannot be captured without presupposing personal identity

The nondelusionality of quasi memory

1. memory == apparent memory and to correctly take it as being one’s own experience

2. delusion == apparent memory and to incorrectly take it as being one’s own experience

3. quasi memory == apparent memory (properly caused) and to hold no view about whose memory it is, so does not reference sameness of person

   1. But what is this grounded in? How do we have memories without a view about whose the memory is?

Parfit:

We do not quasi-remember other people’s past experiences. But we might begin to do so. . . . Suppose that . . . neuro-surgeons develop ways to create in one brain a copy of a memory-trace in another brain. This might enable us to quasi-remember other people’s past experiences

Section 3,

However,

Parfit does not explicitly define quasi desires, quasi beliefs, or quasi intentions, but he does recognize their importance within his view, and suggests that they can be specified in the same way that quasi memory is

Although quasi states seems like a solution, it is not clear what these states are and how we should define them. Therefore quasi states cannot work without presupposing a superficial view of the nature of experience.

• implies implausible view of human experience

  • memories contain personal information that quasi memories do not seem to have

  • facts about whose memory a given memory is are an integral part of its qualitative content

    • without associations to facts about rememberer’s life and psychology, an apparent memory seems arbitrary

    • or, if entire content of the apparent memory is reproduced, then memory is delusional

• fails to overcome circularity

• cannot overcome circularity

If quasi states include too little of the state they are said to reproduce, they do not capture what is relevant to personal identity

If quasi states include too much of the state they are said to reproduce, then unless sameness of person is assumed, they are delusional

Section 4,

A noncircular account of identity over time requires that the distinction between genuine identity and apparent continuity between psychological states is make without presupposing the identity of or the existence of the person having the states that are continuous.

Quasi states where thought to perform this function because they can perform the task of specifying an identity criterion.

“: “We do not quasi-remember other people’s past experiences. But we might begin to do so.. . . Suppose that . . . neuro-surgeons develop ways to create in one brain a copy of a memory-trace in another brain.” (Schechtman, 1990, p. 78) (pdf)

Upon implanting traces of Paul’s memories in Jane, Jane should conclude that memories of experiences she does not recognize are accurate quasi-memories of experiences had by Paul, but not delusions.

However,

“‘Since Jane seems to remember seeing the lightning, she seems to remember herself seeing the lightning. Her apparent memory may tell her accurately what Paul’s experience was like, but it tells her, falsely, that it was she who had this experience’” (Schechtman, 1990, p. 79) (pdf)

In other words, we cannot imagine a qualitatively like Paul’s occurring in Jane without that state being delusional.

Two questions of personal identity

• reidentification and

  • On this view, details of a person’s memory, contain many conflicting details, however

• on the self-knowledge view

Personal identity is comprised of self-knowledge questions and not reidentification

“The person interested in self-knowledge will ask herself questions of the following sort: ‘Is this really what I believe?’ ‘Is this really what I desire?’ ‘Is this really what I intend?’ Which is to ask, in a specific way, ‘Is this my belief?’ ‘Is this my desire?’ ‘Is this my intention?’ The resources involved in answering these questions would be resources that allowed a person to assign particular psychological states to herself, and so would be at the same time resources for delimiting an individual person, and for answering questions of personal identity.” (Schechtman, 1990, p. 89) (pdf)